Normativity

Abstract

Normativity constitutes an irreducible and non-natural domain that cannot be reconciled with psychological attitudes, motivational states, or acts of the will. Contrary to non-cognitivist and emotivist frameworks, the concept of “mattering” does not describe an activity or a projection of concern, but identifies objective, necessary truths. A pervasive error in metaethics involves conflating normative force with motivating force; while normative beliefs may lead to action in a rational agent, the validity of a reason remains independent of its actual influence on an agent’s motivational set. Consequently, internalist theories that ground reasons in prior desires or informed deliberation are fundamentally flawed, as are constructivist models that locate the source of normativity in reflective endorsement or the legislative power of the will. Instead, normative requirements are analogous to mathematical truths—necessary and objective features of reality that are accessible through rational reflection. These truths resolve the justificatory regress by serving as foundational, irreducible facts about what is rationally or morally required. Ultimately, normativity resides not in the motivational properties of persons, but in the metaphysical properties of reasons themselves. – AI-generated abstract.