Future people, the non-identity problem, and person-affecting principles

Abstract

The Non-Identity Problem challenges the intuition that an act is wrong only if it is “worse for” a specific person. Because many choices—ranging from individual reproductive decisions to large-scale environmental policies—affect the identity of future persons, the resulting individuals cannot be said to have been harmed if their lives remain worth living, as the alternative was non-existence. Prevailing Narrow Person-Affecting Principles fail to capture the moral gravity of these outcomes because they cannot qualify an act as wrong if it is worse for no one. Instead, morality is better explained by Wide Person-Affecting Principles that recognize “existential benefits.” Under this framework, causing someone to exist with a life worth living constitutes an intrinsic benefit, even if non-existence would not have been worse for that person. By adopting a Wide Dual Principle that accounts for both the total sum of benefits (the collective) and the quality of life experienced by each person (the individual), it is possible to demonstrate why choices leading to lower well-being are wrong even when they are worse for no one. This approach provides a solution to the Non-Identity Problem while resisting the Repugnant Conclusion by assigning greater moral weight to significant individual benefits than to marginal collective gains distributed across vast populations. – AI-generated abstract.