Compatibilism and the free will defence: A reply to Bishop
Australasian journal of philosophy, vol. 77, no. 1, 1999, pp. 92–105
Abstract
If John Bishop’s “Upgraded Free Will Defence” does not fail, it actually reinforces a standard Plantinga-style defence, contrary to what he led us to believe. Bishop’s first thesis is that whether or not compatibilism is correct, the Free Will Defence is in difficulty in explaining why God could not have ensured that a Mackie-world was actual. He then offers an upgrading solution, allegedly open to compatibilists and libertarians, to justify God’s rejection of available strategies for ensuring this. Bishop does not take libertarianism or the possibility of middle knowledge as seriously as he needs to in arguing for his first thesis. His upgrading solution is arguably inconsistent with compatibilism. What he has really shown is that to run the defence, one must be a libertarian with respect to fully free (autonomous) agency.
