Intentionality as the mark of the dispositional

Abstract

The evidence that C. B. Martin & K. Pfeifer (1986) offer to substantiate their claim that the five most typical characterizations of intentionality fail to distinguish mental from dispositional physical states is critically evaluated. These five characterizations are F. Brentano’s (1874) notion of the inexistence of the intentional object, R. J. Searle’s (1953) notion of directedness, G. E. M. Anscombe’s (1965) concept of indeterminacy, R. Chisholm’s (1957) concept of permissible falsity, & G. Frege’s (1892) indirect reference/W. V. O. Quine’s (1953) referential opacity. It is demonstrated that Brentano’s, Searle’s, & Anscombe’s marks of intentionality distinguish T-intenTional/dispositional from nondispositional categorial states. Further, it is suggested that Chisholm’s mark of intentionality is too restricted to be of much interest & Frege’s /Quine’s mark is an S-intenSional locution of what someone has either said or might say in the future. Thus, Martin & Pfeifer’s contention that physical dispositions satisfy all traditionally accepted marks of intentionality is found to be false. 2 Tables, 23 References. Adapted from the source document