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Alvin Plantinga Warrant and proper function book In this companion volume to Warrant : the current debate, Alvin Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is, what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one’s cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment. He begins by examining the notion of proper function and its colleagues; purpose, damage, design plan, malfunction, and the like. He then explores the general features of the cognitive design plan, explaining how his account of warrant applies in each of the main areas of the epistemic establishment: knowledge of self, knowledge by way of memory, knowledge of other persons, knowledge by way of testimony, perception, a priori knowledge and belief, induction and probability. He goes on to investigate the question of whether knowledge has a foundationalist structure and concludes with an argument that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best within the context of supernaturalism in theology or metaphysics. Although this book is in some sense a sequel to its companion volume, the arguments do not presuppose those of the first book and it stands alone as a stimulating contribution to epistemology.

Warrant and proper function

Alvin Plantinga

Oxford, 1993

Abstract

In this companion volume to Warrant : the current debate, Alvin Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is, what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one’s cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment. He begins by examining the notion of proper function and its colleagues; purpose, damage, design plan, malfunction, and the like. He then explores the general features of the cognitive design plan, explaining how his account of warrant applies in each of the main areas of the epistemic establishment: knowledge of self, knowledge by way of memory, knowledge of other persons, knowledge by way of testimony, perception, a priori knowledge and belief, induction and probability. He goes on to investigate the question of whether knowledge has a foundationalist structure and concludes with an argument that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best within the context of supernaturalism in theology or metaphysics. Although this book is in some sense a sequel to its companion volume, the arguments do not presuppose those of the first book and it stands alone as a stimulating contribution to epistemology.