Loopholes in moralities

Abstract

A morality may give its own ideal adherents incentives to promote outcomes that — by the lights of this morality itself — are on the whole regrettable. Consider, for instance, a morality according to which some harmful policies, which it would be wrong to execute on one’s own, can be implemented, without any wrongdoing, by a dedicated agent or representative. Such a morality provides incentives to hire such agents in order to circumvent important moral protections. Similarly, some moralities allow the basic requirements of economic justice to be reduced by the interposition of national borders and thus encourage the creation of national borders for the sake of “just-ifying” dramatic inequalities (witness the “homeland” created in the old South Africa). The essay discusses why moralities containing such a loophole are problematic and how they can be modified so as to resolve the problem. This discussion supports a surprisingly strong structural constraint on acceptable moralities.