A voting theory primer for rationalists

Abstract

The article discusses the design and evaluation of voting methods, particularly within the framework of rationalist thought. It argues that voting theory is important for understanding the dynamics of democratic processes in the real world and for clarifying ideas about how to resolve value disputes between multiple agents. The article divides voting methods into single-winner and multi-winner methods, with single-winner methods being used for electing offices such as president and mayor, and multi-winner methods being used for allocating resources such as voting power in a legislature. The article provides an overview of various voting methods, including plurality voting, ranked-choice voting, approval voting, score voting, Condorcet methods, Bucklin methods, delegation-based methods, and rated run-off methods. It also examines the theoretical and practical challenges associated with each method, including the strategic behavior of voters, the potential for vote-splitting and center squeeze effects, and the importance of balancing proportionality with locality and ballot simplicity. – AI-generated abstract.