Living With Uncertainty: the Moral Significance of Ignorance * By MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN

Abstract

Moral decision-making under uncertainty requires a conceptual framework centered on prospective obligation rather than objective outcomes or purely subjective beliefs. Under this prospective account, moral obligation consists in choosing the option that is most reasonable given the agent’s available evidence at the time of action. This avoids the shortcomings of objective views, which fail to guide deliberating agents faced with limited information, and subjective views, which reduce moral reasoning to uncritical introspection. Applied to normative rights, prospective obligation implies that individuals primarily hold a right against being exposed to unreasonable risk of harm rather than an absolute right against harm itself. Furthermore, evaluating moral responsibility demands a strict conceptual distinction between wrongdoing and culpability: while ignorance frequently excuses agents from blameworthiness, it can also accuse, establishing culpability even in cases lacking objective wrongdoing. However, founding prospective obligation strictly on available evidence encounters theoretical difficulties without formal analyses of risk, probability, and the epistemic duties governing evidence gathering. A complete account must also address moral remainders, such as regret and liability, which inevitably arise when agents act under conditions of persistent ignorance. – AI-generated abstract.