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Diana Raffman Vagueness without paradox article The writer proposes a solution to the sorites paradox generated by vague predicates. She cites as an example of such a paradox a series of 50 red patches, each of which is just noticeably different in color from the next, progressing from red to orange; for any patch n, if n is red, then n+1 is red, but patch 50 is orange. The writer contends that the solution to this paradox lies in an appeal to the character of our judgments about the items in the series. Patch n and n+1 both look red if judged as a pair, she explains, but can be seen to be different if judged singly. The writer concludes that this solution implies that, in the case of vague predicates, logic and semantics are more entwined with psychology than might otherwise have been supposed.

Vagueness without paradox

Diana Raffman

Philosophical review, vol. 103, no. 1, 1994, pp. 41–74

Abstract

The writer proposes a solution to the sorites paradox generated by vague predicates. She cites as an example of such a paradox a series of 50 red patches, each of which is just noticeably different in color from the next, progressing from red to orange; for any patch n, if n is red, then n+1 is red, but patch 50 is orange. The writer contends that the solution to this paradox lies in an appeal to the character of our judgments about the items in the series. Patch n and n+1 both look red if judged as a pair, she explains, but can be seen to be different if judged singly. The writer concludes that this solution implies that, in the case of vague predicates, logic and semantics are more entwined with psychology than might otherwise have been supposed.

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