Nonfactualism about normative discourse
Philosophy and phenomenological research, vol. 52, no. 4, 1992, pp. 961–968
Abstract
Nonfactualism–the model here is Allan Gibbard’s highly insightful “Wise Choice, Apt Feelings”– is a very dramatic philosophical response to normative discourse. It requires a nonstandard semantic theory that nonetheless mimics, and dovetails with, standard assertoric semantics. Moreover, it yields a dualism about concepts with explanatory as well as normative uses–e.g., “reason for action”, “meaning”, “good”, and many others (if one assumes meaning holism, language is pervaded with normativity). Gibbard’s account may be unable to yield the fact/value distinction he seeks, which is meant to be term-by-term, conservative of the “Galilean core”, and itself factual.
