Reasoning one's way out of skepticism

Abstract

External world skepticism is often viewed as irrefutable on its own terms, yet it is possible to demonstrate its irrationality by appealing only to premises a skeptic can accept. A commitment to external world skepticism logically entails skepticism about the past, given the parity between the evidentiary gaps of sensory perception and memorial appearances. This skepticism about the past subsequently undermines the rationality of complex reasoning, as multi-step arguments rely on memory to connect premises to conclusions. Because the philosophical case for skepticism is itself a complex argument, accepting the skeptic’s conclusion requires believing a proposition while simultaneously believing that belief in that proposition is not rational. Such a state violates higher-order requirements of rationality, specifically the principle that an agent should not denounce their own beliefs. Furthermore, suspending judgment on skepticism provides no rational refuge, as it similarly violates requirements for doxastic endorsement and results in an impoverished epistemic state lacking internal justification. Since rationality must provide guidance and cannot prohibit all possible doxastic attitudes, the impossibility of doxastic dilemmas necessitates the rejection of the skeptical conclusion. Rationality thus requires believing that skepticism is false, as the alternative positions are inherently self-undermining. – AI-generated abstract.