The nonidentity problem

Abstract

The nonidentity problem raises questions regarding the obligations wethink we have in respect of people who, by our own acts, are causedboth to exist and to have existences that are, though worth having,unavoidably flawed – existences, that is, that are flawed ifthose people are ever to have them at all. If a person’sexistence is unavoidably flawed, then the agent’s onlyalternatives to bringing that person into the flawed existence are tobring no one into existence at all or to bring a different person– a nonidentical but better off person – intoexistence in place of the one person. If the existence is worth havingand no one else’s interests are at stake, it is unclear on whatground morality would insist that the choice to bring the one personinto the flawed existence is morally wrong. And yet at the same time– as we shall see – it seems that in some cases such achoice clearly is morally wrong. The nonidentity problem isthe problem of resolving this apparent paradox.