Hume on personal identity

Abstract

It is commonly assumed that Hume denies the existence of an immaterial self. But Hume’s arguments do not support that conclusion; he denied that he meant to draw it; and there is no theoretical support for the claim that he is committed to it anyway. In fact, the explanatory model by which Hume explains how we suppose, e.g., external objects presupposes such a self. Hume’s vague realization that the model breaks down when he comes to explain how we suppose a simple and identical self accounts for his confession in the appendix that he is committed to two principles he “cannot render consistent” or renounce. Those principles are not inconsistent with each other, or, as Kemp Smith claims, with our “awareness of personal identity.” together with other principles of Hume’s philosophy they imply that we have no idea of the self, and they are inconsistent with having to have that idea to make the explanatory model work.