The identities of persons
Berkeley, California, 1976
Abstract
The concept of personhood consists of various overlapping strands and cannot be reduced to necessary and sufficient conditions. Different historical conceptions - characters, figures, persons, selves, individuals - inhabit distinct intellectual and social spaces. Characters are defined by their traits and dispositions, while figures are determined by their roles in archetypal narratives. The concept of person emerged from legal and theatrical traditions, focusing on agency and responsibility. Selves are defined as possessors of properties, while individuals represent centers of integrity with inalienable rights. Modern philosophical discussions of personal identity often privilege personhood over other conceptions, but this reflects particular perspectives on human agency rather than logical priority. The different concepts generate distinct criteria for identity and reidentification - those appropriate for characters differ from those for figures, selves or individuals. Understanding these distinctions helps illuminate contemporary debates about personal identity and reveals how different conceptions of human subjects enable different forms of social and political organization. The concept of person now dominates philosophical analysis precisely because earlier conceptions are in conflict, leading us to seek stable principles of choice and action. However, treating persons as the paradigmatic form obscures important aspects captured by other historical conceptualizations. - AI-generated abstract
