The repugnant conclusion and worthwhile living

Abstract

The requirement to block the Repugnant Conclusion is not a necessary condition for the adequacy of a population-ethical theory. The perceived repugnance of this conclusion relies on the faulty premise that a life barely worth living is significantly worse than a normal privileged life. In reality, the daily content of a privileged life is often close to neutrality, consisting of numerous neutral periods and a balance of positive and negative experiences that do not result in a vast surplus of well-being. Several psychological factors, including selective memory, evolutionary dispositions toward self-preservation, and adaptive preferences, lead to an overestimation of the value of normal lives compared to the neutral level. Traditional objections based on the harm of premature death, the incidence of suicide, or a preference for conscious experience over unconsciousness fail to establish a significant qualitative gap, as these phenomena are frequently influenced by biological drives and goal-oriented mental frameworks rather than objective assessments of net happiness. Consequently, if a life barely worth living does not fundamentally differ from the mundane reality of a typical privileged existence, the moral weight of the Repugnant Conclusion is substantially reduced. – AI-generated abstract.