Predation

Abstract

Predation in nature raises moral concerns about the obligation to alleviate avoidable animal suffering. One argument, the predation reductio, posits that if humans have such an obligation, they should prevent predation, which is absurd and thus the premise is false. This article evaluates and refutes this argument through three strategies. First, it considers different forms of absurdity and argues that the absurdity alleged in the predation reductio does not hold. Second, it argues that even if preventing predation were an impractical moral ideal, it can guide what is attainable. Third, it examines the inference from the obligation to alleviate avoidable animal suffering to the obligation to prevent predation and shows that this inference is invalid in practical contexts. The article concludes that the predation reductio fails to discredit the obligation to alleviate avoidable animal suffering – AI-generated abstract.