The construction of attitudes
In Abraham Tesser and Norbert Schwarz (eds.) Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intraindividual Processes, Malden, MA, 2007, pp. 436–457
Abstract
Historically regarded as enduring mental states, attitudes are increasingly conceptualized as evaluative judgments constructed at the moment of assessment rather than as stable entities retrieved from memory. Empirical evidence demonstrates that self-reported attitudes are highly malleable, reflecting the influence of contextual factors such as question wording, response formats, and item order. These context effects stem from the cognitive processes involved in judgment, including the pragmatic interpretation of questions and the retrieval of information from memory. Individuals typically rely on a subset of chronically and temporarily accessible information to form mental representations of both the attitude object and a comparison standard. Depending on how this information is categorized, its inclusion in or exclusion from the object representation results in predictable assimilation or contrast effects. Even implicit measures, designed to bypass conscious reporting biases, remain subject to significant contextual variations. Furthermore, the degree of consistency between reported attitudes and overt behavior depends on the match between the mental representations active during the judgment phase and those present during the behavioral decision. Within this framework, stability and consistency are not inherent properties of the attitude itself but outcomes of using similar evaluative inputs across different temporal or situational contexts. – AI-generated abstract.
