Moral uncertainty and the principle of equity among moral theories
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 86, no. 3, 2013, pp. 580–589
Abstract
To address moral uncertainty, when moral views recommend conflicting courses of action, the expected moral value of an action can be determined by summing the moralities of the different possible actions by their probabilities. Comparison across theories by comparing their moralities in a situation, known as the principle of equity among moral theories (PEMT), does not work, however. First, this approach wrongly makes the rankings of two actions dependent on which alternative actions are available. Second, it can generate inconsistent assignments of moral value. Third, it can lead to courses of action that are dominated by other courses of action. Fourth, the principle is arbitrary: the reason for it cannot be justified. A modified PEMT, which compares theories by comparing their moralities over all conceivable situations, also has serious flaws, and a more reasonable solution remains elusive. – AI-generated abstract.
