Should You Look Before You Leap?:

Abstract

Action-guiding moral theories typically introduce meta-rules, such as maximizing expected moral value, to navigate uncertainty regarding first-order normative claims. However, uncertainty concerning the correctness of meta-rules threatens an infinite guidance regress, suggesting that agents are ultimately condemned to unguided leaps of faith. While distinguishing between conscious and dispositional uncertainty resolves the psychological regress—since deliberative demands cease when conscious doubt ends—it fails to resolve the normative challenge of mitigating moral recklessness. Halting reflection through psychological confidence does not inherently eliminate normative risk. Nevertheless, ascending to higher-order meta-rules provides a distinct normative advantage. Unguided decisions are not arbitrary; taking a leap of faith at a given level typically consists in implicitly accepting an unscrutinized higher-order rule. Actively reflecting on competing meta-rules and adopting higher-order aggregating principles prevents agents from arbitrarily ignoring plausible normative options. Analogous to information gathering, higher-order moral reflection forestalls moral recklessness by ensuring that actions account for a broader, more systematically evaluated range of normative considerations, even if absolute certainty remains unattainable. – AI-generated abstract.