The epistemic argument for hedonism

Abstract

The paper argues that widespread moral disagreement necessitates moral skepticism. It is argued that given the prevalence of error in moral beliefs, only beliefs formed through reliable processes should be retained. The author contends that moral intuitions, whether rational or emotional, are unreliable, and reflective equilibrium cannot reliably generate a true moral theory. Furthermore, conceptual analysis, while reliable, cannot provide a complete normative ethical theory. The only reliable process for forming moral beliefs is phenomenal introspection, which reveals the goodness of pleasure and displeasure. The author proposes that pleasure’s goodness is genuine moral value, and that while introspection only reveals its prudential value for the experiencer, it also reveals its moral value for others, lending support to altruistic hedonism. This leads to the conclusion that the only moral beliefs we should retain are those grounded in pleasure’s goodness and its implications for other moral concepts, suggesting a version of ethical hedonism. – AI-generated abstract.