Sumner on welfare

Abstract

A review essay on a book by L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). This text reveals the subjectivity of welfare, demonstrates that hedonism & preference theories of welfare are deficient, provides an alternative paradigm of welfare, & advocates welfare’s moral supremacy. Sumner’s assertion that informed preferences are unable to satisfactorily account for welfare because of their failure to connect individuals’ experiences & expectations is challenged. It is maintained that Sumner’s interpretation is contradicted by the long-standing argument that preferences must be truly appreciated before denominating them “informed.” Sumner’s rationality-based notion of informed preferences is rejected, because it is impossible for humans to become completely informed on some subjects. Sumner’s comparison of welfarism with other views that claim moral supremacy is welcomed. The need to address questions surrounding how support to social actors is to be provided is expressed. Despite the aforementioned shortcomings, Sumner’s text is deemed an important contribution to the study of welfare’s moral significance. J. W. Parker.