Pleasure, suffering and the experience of value

Abstract

This dissertation investigates the nature of pleasure and suffering, focusing on the notion that pleasant experiences are inherently good and unpleasant experiences are bad. It defends the “Self-Experiential View” of pleasure, arguing that pleasant experiences are pleasant because they are experienced as good. Additionally, it examines the “Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis,” which posits that our intimate relationship with the evaluative qualities of our hedonic experiences provides a special kind of epistemic justification for our beliefs about pleasure and pain, making them less susceptible to skepticism. The dissertation scrutinizes two versions of this thesis: the “Naïve Realist Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis” and the “Introspective Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis,” ultimately rejecting both. The conclusion summarizes the key findings and points to further questions for future exploration.