Ethical naturalism

Abstract

Ethical naturalism identifies moral properties as natural properties that occupy a place within a scientifically grounded worldview. This metaethical position asserts that ethical facts are subject to empirical investigation in the same manner as other natural phenomena. Central to modern defenses of this view is the rejection of G.E. Moore’s “open question argument,” which mistakenly assumed that property identity necessitates semantic synonymy. By distinguishing between reductive and nonreductive naturalism, it is possible to maintain that ethical terms refer to natural properties even in the absence of analytic definitions. The metaphysical status of these properties is supported by their causal and explanatory roles in the natural order, where moral character and actions produce observable effects. Furthermore, the “is-ought” gap does not represent a unique logical barrier but parallels inferential transitions found in other naturalistic disciplines, such as the move from observable behavior to psychological states. Knowledge of ethical facts is obtained through nonfoundationalist epistemologies, such as reflective equilibrium, wherein moral beliefs are refined through a dialectical engagement with empirical evidence. While critics contend that naturalism cannot account for the motivational force of morality, a naturalistic psychology involving second-order desires and social cooperation provides a sufficient basis for understanding moral reasons. Ultimately, the success of ethical naturalism is tied to the broader viability of philosophical naturalism and the progress of empirical inquiry into human nature. – AI-generated abstract.