Response to Derek Parfit
In Peter van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.) Metaphysics: The Big Questions, Malden, MA, 1998, pp. 427–429
Abstract
The existence of the universe cannot be causally explained if defined as the totality of all substances, yet it may be attributed to a single, foundational substance that causes all other entities. Principles of inductive inference favor this explanation due to the simplicity of postulating one supreme substance over the infinite complexity of a many-worlds hypothesis. Unlike non-causal axiomatic principles, which lack empirical parallels within the observable world, the intentional action of a substance is a recognized explanatory category. Laws of nature do not function as independent agents but are reducible to the inherent powers and liabilities of substances. Consequently, a non-causal explanation for the universe’s existence requires postulating a mechanism that is never operative in localized effects, whereas a causal explanation involving a primary substance aligns with the established logic of intentional agency. Because any ultimate explanation must terminate in a brute fact, the existence of the simplest possible substance constitutes a more robust and parsimonious foundation for reality than abstract laws or principles that operate without substance-mediated action. – AI-generated abstract.
