Empirical and a priori elements in Broad's theory of knowledge

Abstract

The epistemological account of empirical concepts through abstraction and direct acquaintance with universals encounters fundamental circularity, as the act of perceiving an object as possessing a specific quality presupposes the conceptual ability it is intended to generate. Theoretical shifts toward “prehension” or acquaintance with sense-particulars fail to resolve this, often resulting in a redundancy where conceptual dispositions are merely deferred to an innate level. Furthermore, the treatment of linguistic signs as external adjuncts linked by association ignores the constitutive role of linguistic roles and observation dispositions in conceptual development. Modal concepts of necessity and contingency similarly resist an empirical derivation, as necessity cannot be consistently characterized as a non-sensuous appearance abstracted from facts. Concepts traditionally classified as a priori—such as cause, substance, and obligation—are better explained as emerging from role-similarities within a linguistic framework and verbal-action dispositions rather than through non-perceptual intuition or innate ideas. An adequate theory of knowledge must move beyond the psychological distinction between thinking in the presence or absence of objects to address the functional and linguistic structures that underpin conceptual classification and the “tie” between thought and environment. – AI-generated abstract.