Joseph Rotblat: a man of conscience in the nuclear age

Wertenstein instilled in Rotblat the idea that a scientist always bears responsibility for the consequences of his or her work; thus Rotblat came to believe in a ‘Hippocratic Oath’ whereby scientists would pledge themselves to use their talents for the benefit of humanity. He was always opposed to the view that the discoveries of science are in some sense neutral; according to him, scientists must never be indifferent to what they do and produce. This belief, arrived at by Rotblat early on under the influence of Wertenstein, was to permeate his future life and work.

Rotblat was of the view that a good grounding in ethics should be part of all scientists’ education.

His less than perfect grasp of the language could produce solecisms; once, for instance, when penning a letter of thanks after a weekend in the country, he wrote: ‘thank you for being so hostile to me’ (BLSA).

When Poland was overrun, Rotblat made the decision to work on the bomb. His belief was that the allied scientists needed to do this in order to make it possible for the bomb not to be used. In other words the reasoning goes: if it is possible for Hitler to have the bomb, then the only way we can prevent him from using it (against us) would be by us having it too (without using it).

During a visit to Los Alamos, General Groves declared at a dinner party that the primary reason for developing a bomb was to defeat Stalin and to subdue the Soviets. Rotblat was appalled, since the Soviet Union was our ally.

Rotblat’s ambivalence about the project deepened when he was able to conclude that, given the enormous scientific, technological and financial effort involved in producing a bomb, Germany simply did not have the resources for it.

I was in Los Alamos for less than a year. Well, I came in the beginning of 1944, and left by the end of 1944. As soon as I came to Los Alamos, I realized that my fear about the Germans making the bomb was ungrounded, because I could see the enormous effort which was required by the American[s], with all their resources practically intact, intact by the war — everything that you wanted was put into the effort. Even so, I could see that it’s still far away, and that by that time the war in Europe was showing that Hitler is going to be defeated, and I could see that probably the bomb won’t be ready; even that Hitler wouldn’‘t have it in any case. Therefore I could see this from the beginning, that my being there, in the light of the reason why I came to work on it, was not really justified. But nevertheless, I could not be sure that the Germans would not find a shortcut maybe and they could still make the bomb. Therefore I kept on working together with the other people, although I was very unhappy about having to work on it. But as soon as I learned, towards the end of 1944, that the Germans have abandoned the project, in fact a long time before, I decided that my presence there was no longer justified, and I resigned and I went back to England.

In 1985, in a seminal paper for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists entitled ‘Leaving the bomb project’ (Appendix 1), Rotblat declared that working on the Manhattan Project had been a traumatic experience, and one which endured throughout his future life. It is not often given, and certainly not to anyone, to participate in the birth of a new era, he observes.

Rotblat asked himself why other scientists did not make the same decision: why did they not leave? For some of them, scientific curiosity was paramount. They wanted to know whether the theoretical predictions would turn out to be true. Others believed that the work should continue, on the grounds that many American lives would be saved if the weapon was used to bring about a rapid end to the war with Japan. Some agreed that the work should have ceased when it became clear that Germany had abandoned work, but they feared that entertaining this view or acting on it could harm their future career.

The time spent in Los Alamos was perhaps the pivotal intellectual experience of Rotblat’s life, while the loss of Tola can be seen as his central emotional experience.

Rotblat was appalled by the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima (of which he heard on the radio) and subsequently on Nagasaki. Partly in reaction to the horrors of the atomic bomb, he became more interested in the medical uses of nuclear radiation.

A key change occurred in Rotblat’s thinking at this time. He realized that the argument to develop nuclear weapons that permitted him to work on them, that is, the argument for deterrence, was false. It would not have worked with Hitler, because Hitler would have used such weapons in spite of any consequences. Rotblat’s own reasoning in favour of working on nuclear weapons was invalid. He proposed what looks like a naive idea: that there should be a moratorium on research related to nuclear weapons. He talked to his colleagues in Liverpool, knowing this to be a drastic plan; nevertheless it seems that it had a warm reception.

Interestingly for him, the harshest opposition to his proposals came from left-wing physicists, including Blackett from Imperial College and Powell, with whom he worked closely during the war. Their point was that the US would have a monopoly over nuclear research and would dictate matters until the Soviets developed nuclear weapons too.

The manifesto goes on to say that we have to learn to think in a new way; we should not ask what is required to achieve a military victory for our nation, province and so on, but what steps can be taken to prevent a military engagement that would be disastrous to all parties.

The signatories recognized that the abolition of war would mean limitations on the power and influence of sovereign states, but they warned that the alternative we face is possible total destruction. The manifesto ends with a call to

In view of the fact that in any future world war nuclear weapons will be certainly employed, and that such weapons threaten the existence of mankind, we urge the Governments of the World to realize, and to acknowledge publicly, their purpose cannot be furthered by a world war, and we urge them, consequently, to find peaceful means for the settlement of matters of dispute between them.

The committee estimated that the nuclear tests conducted up until then would result in an increase of about 1 per cent over the natural incidence of leukaemia and bone cancer throughout the coming decade.

This objective calls for the lessening of tensions between nations; the ending of the arms race; effective arms control systems; and the suspension of nuclear bomb tests.

The US authorities had not allowed the Japanese to collect their own statistics on radiation exposure and its consequences.

[A]lthough the nations may agree to eliminate nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of the world, the knowledge of how to produce such weapons can never be destroyed. They remain for all time a potential threat to mankind. In any future major war, each belligerent will feel not only free but compelled to undertake immediate production of nuclear weapons; no state, when at war, can be sure that such steps are not being taken by the enemy. We believe that, in such a situation, a major industrial power would require less than one year to begin accumulating weapons. From then on, the only restraint against their employment in war would be agreements not to use them, which were concluded in times of peace… the decisive power of nuclear weapons, however, would make the temptation to use them almost irresistible, particularly to leaders that are facing defeat.

This conference stressed that Pugwash meetings were private, but not secret.

(OJur common purpose is the survival of Man, which is in jeopardy. It is impossible to imagine a more important purpose.’

Bertrand Russell was appointed president of the CND. He believed that the campaign and Pugwash should exist as separate entities and should divide jobs between them, the former taking a public position and the latter operating essentially in private.

Apart from this, Pugwash can claim to have been instrumental in achieving the agreement in 1963 on the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Pugwash can also be credited with helping to establish links between the US and Vietnam in the late 1960s; the negotiation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972. More specifically, credit for these landmark achievements should go to Rotblat.

He emphasized that independence was not easy to maintain, but the conference has managed it throughout the years.