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Ralph Wedgwood Normativism defended incollection Intentionality is inherently normative because the nature of every concept and mental attitude is defined by the normative principles of correctness and rationality that apply to them. Concept possession requires a personal-level disposition to conform to basic rational requirements, such as a disposition to accept fundamental inferences or to form judgments based on specific perceptual experiences. These dispositions function as ceteris paribus laws, meaning that empirical evidence of human irrationality does not undermine the normativity of the intentional; instead, irrationality represents the failure to manifest a disposition due to interfering factors or abnormal conditions. This normative account remains distinct from empirical psychology, which investigates the contingent, sub-personal mechanisms that realize these rational dispositions. While empirical science clarifies how the mind functions in practice, the essential nature of intentional states is accessible through a priori reflection on the rational powers necessary for thought. Revisionary philosophical stances that reject specific logical laws are consistent with this framework, as such thinkers typically retain a general disposition toward rational inference despite localized, theoretically driven deviations. – AI-generated abstract.

Normativism defended

Ralph Wedgwood

In Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.) Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, Malden, MA, 2007, pp. 85–102

Abstract

Intentionality is inherently normative because the nature of every concept and mental attitude is defined by the normative principles of correctness and rationality that apply to them. Concept possession requires a personal-level disposition to conform to basic rational requirements, such as a disposition to accept fundamental inferences or to form judgments based on specific perceptual experiences. These dispositions function as ceteris paribus laws, meaning that empirical evidence of human irrationality does not undermine the normativity of the intentional; instead, irrationality represents the failure to manifest a disposition due to interfering factors or abnormal conditions. This normative account remains distinct from empirical psychology, which investigates the contingent, sub-personal mechanisms that realize these rational dispositions. While empirical science clarifies how the mind functions in practice, the essential nature of intentional states is accessible through a priori reflection on the rational powers necessary for thought. Revisionary philosophical stances that reject specific logical laws are consistent with this framework, as such thinkers typically retain a general disposition toward rational inference despite localized, theoretically driven deviations. – AI-generated abstract.

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