Must Rational Intentions Maximize Utility?

Abstract

Rational choices and intentions are widely characterized as maximizing expected value, yet an internal critique reveals that the standard neo-Humean conception—defining value as utility derived from subjective preferences—fails on its own terms. To be represented by an expected utility function, an agent’s preferences must satisfy specific structural and coherence axioms. However, neither conceiving preferences as affective likings nor as conditional choices satisfies these requirements. Likings are partial and prone to unresolvable conflict, whereas choices exhibit menu dependence and context sensitivity in the presence of incommensurable goods. The only construal of preference that can satisfy the requisite axioms interprets them as comparative evaluative judgments regarding an option’s desirability. Under this interpretation, subjective preference and utility become analytically redundant, as practical deliberation is directly governed by subjective expectations of goodness. Practical rationality therefore requires the maximization of expected choiceworthiness rather than expected utility, favoring a neo-Aristotelian framework of rational choice over the neo-Humean alternative. – AI-generated abstract.