Andreas Mogensen on whether effective altruism is just for consequentialists

Abstract

In a world as full of preventable suffering as our own, a simple ‘principle of beneficence’ is probably the only premise one needs to grant for the effective altruist project of identifying the most impactful ways to help others to be of great moral interest and importance. In this conversation, Andreas and Rob discuss how robust the above line of argument is, and also cover: • Should we treat philosophical thought experiments that feature very large numbers with great suspicion? • If we had to allow someone to die to avoid preventing the football World Cup final from being broadcast to the world, is that permissible or not? If not, what might that imply? • What might a virtue ethicist regard as ‘doing the most good’? • If a deontological theory of morality parted ways with common effective altruist practices, how would that likely be? • If we can explain how we came to hold a view on a moral issue by referring to evolutionary selective pressures, should we disbelieve that view?