Indirect utilitarianism
In James E. Crimmins (ed.) The Bloomsbury encyclopedia of utilitarianism, London, 2013, pp. 269–72
Abstract
Directly aiming to maximize happiness frequently proves self-defeating due to epistemic, psychological, and social constraints. Human agents often lack the information and cognitive impartiality required to calculate optimal outcomes, and a known disposition to break rules for the sake of utility undermines the trust necessary for beneficial social cooperation. Indirect utilitarianism addresses these limitations by distinguishing the criterion of moral rightness from the practical decision procedures used by agents. By adopting non-utilitarian motives, rules of thumb, or strict adherence to principles, individuals may produce greater total happiness than through direct calculation. This indirectness exists on a spectrum, culminating in self-effacing utilitarianism, where the theory may require agents to reject utilitarian belief entirely in favor of alternative moral frameworks. Although critics suggest this approach violates the publicity requirement of moral theories and threatens psychological integrity, proponents maintain that such factors are only valuable insofar as they contribute to utility. If a radically indirect stance is empirically necessary to achieve optimal consequences, the theory mandates its own secondary status in practical deliberation. – AI-generated abstract.
