In defence of fanaticism

Abstract

In defence of fanaticism, this paper argues that it is better to accept fanaticism and the fanatical verdicts inspired by expected value theory than to deny them and accept the alternatives. It cites the works of thinkers like Bostrom, Hájek, and Tarsney to present arguments against fanaticism, but argues that those arguments would lead to objectionable positions if accepted. For instance, denying fanaticism would require accepting absurd levels of sensitivity to tiny changes in lotteries. Or it would require background uncertainty to irrationally influence one’s evaluation of lotteries. The paper calls these the “Egyptology Objection” and the “Indology Objection”, respectively. In light of these objections, the article concludes that it is better to accept both fanaticism and expected value theory than to deny either. – AI-generated abstract.