Moral luck: Philosophical papers, 1973-1980

Abstract

The book critiques various Kantian-inspired moral philosophies (including Rawls, Richards, and Nagel) by arguing that they fail to fully account for the importance of individual character and personal relations in moral experience. The author argues that the Kantian view misrepresents the human person by emphasizing a detached, abstract conception of moral agency that privileges impartial morality over the particularity of individual projects and desires. The author criticizes the Kantian view through a discussion of Derek Parfit’s Complex View of personal identity, which emphasizes the scalar character of psychological connectedness. The author further argues that the Kantian neglect of character leads to an overemphasis on the demands of impartial morality, ultimately undermining the individual’s reason for living. Finally, the article argues that the Kantian emphasis on abstraction from individual character is a misrepresentation of moral experience, since it fails to fully account for the limits and complexities of moral life. – AI-generated abstract.