Moral saints

Abstract

This paper examines the concept of a moral saint, arguing that although moral perfection is often considered a desirable ideal, it is actually an unattractive and ultimately undesirable goal. The author discusses two common models of moral sainthood – the Loving Saint and the Rational Saint – and finds both to be deficient. The Loving Saint, who derives happiness solely from the happiness of others, appears to lack a genuine capacity for personal fulfillment, while the Rational Saint, who sacrifices his own desires to the demands of morality, seems to suffer from a lack of spontaneity and joy. The author further argues that neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism, two prominent moral theories, can offer a more appealing model of moral sainthood. Utilitarianism, with its emphasis on happiness, might appear to favor the Loving Saint, but the author argues that a world populated by moral saints would likely be less happy than a world in which individuals pursue a variety of personal and perfectionist values. Kantianism, with its focus on reason and universal principles, may seem to favor the Rational Saint, but the author suggests that even a more restrictive interpretation of Kantian doctrine, which focuses on specific obligations and constraints rather than an all-consuming commitment to morality, ultimately fails to provide an ideal that is both ethically sound and personally fulfilling. In conclusion, the author argues that rather than seeking to achieve moral perfection, we should acknowledge that moral value is only one aspect of a well-lived life and that other non-moral values, such as personal excellence and the pursuit of individual interests, play a vital role in a fulfilling human existence. – AI-generated abstract.