Mind-body meets metaethics: A moral concept strategy

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to assess the relationship between\textbackslashnanti-physicalist arguments in the philosophy of mind and anti-naturalist\textbackslashnarguments in metaethics, and to show how the literature on the mind-body\textbackslashnproblem can inform metaethics. Among the questions we will consider are:\textbackslashn(1) whether a moral parallel of the knowledge argument can be\textbackslashnconstructed to create trouble for naturalists, (2) the relationship\textbackslashnbetween such a ``Moral Knowledge Argument'’\ and the familiar Open\textbackslashnQuestion Argument, and (3) how naturalists can respond to the Moral Twin\textbackslashnEarth argument. We will give particular attention to recent arguments in\textbackslashnthe philosophy of mind that aim to show that anti-physicalist arguments\textbackslashncan be defused by acknowledging a distinctive kind of conceptual dualism\textbackslashnbetween the phenomenal and the physical. This tactic for evading\textbackslashnanti-physicalist arguments has come to be known as the Phenomenal\textbackslashnConcept Strategy. We will propose a metaethical version of this\textbackslashnstrategy, which we shall call the `Moral Concept Strategy’. We suggest\textbackslashnthat the Moral Concept Strategy offers the most promising way out of\textbackslashnthese anti-naturalist arguments, though significant challenges remain.