Mind-body meets metaethics: A moral concept strategy

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to assess the relationship between\nanti-physicalist arguments in the philosophy of mind and anti-naturalist\narguments in metaethics, and to show how the literature on the mind-body\nproblem can inform metaethics. Among the questions we will consider are:\n(1) whether a moral parallel of the knowledge argument can be\nconstructed to create trouble for naturalists, (2) the relationship\nbetween such a ``Moral Knowledge Argument'’\ and the familiar Open\nQuestion Argument, and (3) how naturalists can respond to the Moral Twin\nEarth argument. We will give particular attention to recent arguments in\nthe philosophy of mind that aim to show that anti-physicalist arguments\ncan be defused by acknowledging a distinctive kind of conceptual dualism\nbetween the phenomenal and the physical. This tactic for evading\nanti-physicalist arguments has come to be known as the Phenomenal\nConcept Strategy. We will propose a metaethical version of this\nstrategy, which we shall call the `Moral Concept Strategy’. We suggest\nthat the Moral Concept Strategy offers the most promising way out of\nthese anti-naturalist arguments, though significant challenges remain.