Taking liberties: The perils of "moralizing" freedom and coercion in social theory and practice

Abstract

It is argued that, in any political or social morality, it is dangerous to take liberty & voluntariness, & their opposites - coercion & interference with liberty - as “essentially moralized,” ie, to assume that the “very conditions that constitute an action or practice as having some putatively basic nonmoral right-making or wrong-making property contain an ineliminable reference to prior & independent moral rights & wrongs, which are conceptually & metaphysically distinct from those properties.” Some reasons why liberty concepts might be moralized are explored, & it is argued that such “essential moralization” renders these features of social & political institutions & practices “derivative.” The essential moralization of both liberty in general & several specific liberties is criticized, offering examples from a range of recent theories & historical cases. The critical difference between essential moralization & right-making property foundationalism in moral theory is explored, & the practice of essential moralizing in liberal & libertarian consequentialism & libertarian deontology is examined. K. Hyatt Stewart.